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In this paper we do a couple of things: discussing a way to measure the welfare cost of country risk, 
and measuring it for Argentina in the period 1875-2006. There are two conclusions: a) the welfare 
cost of Argentine risk has been huge: for example, in the period 1976-2006 it was around 20% of 
GDP, several times larger than the welfare cost of any conventional distortion; b) this cost would be 




Este artículo tiene dos objetivos: discutir una forma de medir el costo de bienestar del riesgo-país, y 
medirlo para Argentina en el período 1875-2006. Arribamos a dos conclusiones: a) el costo de 
bienestar del riesgo-argentino ha sido enorme: por ejemplo, en el período 1976-2006 fue alrededor 
de 20% del PBI, varias veces mayor que el costo de bienestar de cualquier distorsión convencional; 
b) este costo sería pagado en un 100% por el factor trabajo. Estos fascinantes resultados merecen 
más investigación. 
 
JEL: D63, D82, O12, O16 
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1 The ideas explored in this paper go back to Avila (1999). I am grateful for comments made by J. Streb and 
other members of the Economics Seminar at UCEMA. The viewpoints are personal and do not necessarily 








The big issue regarding the Argentine economy is her quick growth in the late 19
th century 
and her long decline for most of the 20
th century. Many authors have written on this matter. 
Cortés Conde (1997) explains persuasively the 19
th century miracle. He argues that the end 
of the civil wars provided the political and legal stability the country badly needed to assert 
property rights and cut transaction costs, adding that this achievement was the factor behind 
the huge inflows of capital and labor that built modern Argentina. Sturzenegger (1984) and 
Cavallo (1984) provide a suggestive explanation for the 20
th century decline. Since the 
Argentine economy has been a mixed economy for most of the last century, Sturzenegger 
argues that its capitalist sector did not have real markets while the socialist sector did not 
have central planning; he adds that policy-induced distortions worsened conditions such as 
competition, appropriability, and certainty that are required for markets to work efficiently, 
while political instability worsened conditions for planning where markets fail. Cavallo, in 
turn, stresses the impact on the rate of growth of some static distortions (taxes, regulations, 
and trade barriers). He may be right in a certain sense: even when a static distortion yields a 
once-and-for-all reduction in the level of national income, a crescendo of static distortions 
may yield a long-run sequence of national income reductions that looks like a reduction in 
the rate of economic growth. 
Later on, we developed a country-risk approach to explain the 19
th century miracle, the 
20
th century decline, as well as the business cycle in Argentina (Avila 2008, 2010, 2011). 
Based on empirical evidence, we find this approach compelling. The task of this paper is to 
investigate the welfare cost of the Argentine risk. As far as we know, there are no previous 
studies on this issue. 
Section I deals with the concept of country risk. Section II makes focus on a specific 
equation to calculate the cost of Argentine risk. Section III measures it for the period 1875-
2006.  Section  IV  argues  that  labor  pays  the  whole  welfare  cost  of  country  risk  under 




I. Country risk as special tax 
 
Investment is a gamble whose outcome we know as time goes by. Therefore, the right place 
to study the effect of country risk is the economy’s intertemporal market. Figure 1 shows 
the impact of the country-risk premium on the capital market of a country that is open to 
international capital flows. On the vertical axis, we measure the marginal yield on capital 
per worker; on the horizontal axis, the capital per worker that has been sunk in the country. 
Without country risk, equilibrium takes place at point 0 E , where the domestic interest rate i 
equals the foreign interest rate i*, and capital per local worker k equals capital per worker 
in the group of leading countries k*. A social optimum obtains when investment in the 
country is not penalized by country risk. (We speak of a social optimum because this kind 
of uncertainty does not come from foreign but from domestic sources; country risk is a self-
inflicted  cost,  stemming  from  frequent  and  sudden  changes  in  economic  policy.)  With 
country  risk,  the  premium  filters  into the  capital  market  opening  a  wedge  between  the 
marginal yield on capital i and the marginal compensation for savers i*. From a social point 
of  view,  the  optimum  requires  k=k*,  while  from  the  private  point  of  view  it  requires 
* 1 k k k £ = . The country-risk premium * i i - = r  works like a tax collected by investors to 
provide against imponderables. 
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On the one hand, the country-risk premium creates a distortion with a welfare cost that 
takes the shape of triangle
'
1 1 0 E E E  in figure 1. As the premium rises, the triangle gets bigger 
because the productivity of sunken capital increasingly exceeds the opportunity cost of the 
resource. On the other, it generates the rectangle *
'
1 1 i E iE , analogous to that representing the 
revenue of a conventional tax. Yet this time it measures the economic cost of anxiety and 
partial insurance that investors find hard to avoid in the face of country risk. Unlike a 
conventional tax, whose revenues go straight to the Treasury, the country-risk rectangle 
stands for a social cost because it represents a drain on resources that benefits no-one.
2 So 
the welfare cost of country risk is equal to: 
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The right-hand side of the equation has two terms: the first measures the triangle and the 
second, the rectangle. The triangle is equal to half the country-risk premium over the gap in 
capital per worker that separates the lagging country from the leading group. The rectangle 
is equal to the country-risk premium over the country’s sunken capital per worker. 
 
II. An equation to measure the welfare cost 
 
To calculate WCCR we need a specific formulation for equation 1. We begin by assuming 
an economy with a constant-returns-to-scale production function: 
 
2) 
a a - =
1 ) (LA K Y  
 
Output or income Y results from combining the services of capital K and labor L resources. 
Parameters a  and A stand for output elasticity of capital and an index of labor-augmenting 
technological progress, respectively. With perfect competition, a  also represents the share 
of capital in output (1-a  represents the share of labor). Equation 2, in turn, can be written 
in this way: 
 
                                                 
2 Regarding trade barriers, Krueger (1984, p. 544) writes that “rent-seeking converts much or all of the 
rectangle from transfer payments to a deadweight loss.” This reference helps to understand that the rectangle 

























It helps to make consistent two empirical regularities: a capital-labor ratio that rises through 
time with a capital-output ratio that stays rather constant (Romer 1989). Labor-augmenting 
technological progress (a higher A) leads to proportionally higher capital-labor ratio in the 














Equation 4 says that the marginal product of capital must equal the domestic interest rate, 


















Equation 5 says that the marginal product of capital in the leading countries must equal the 
foreign (risk free) interest rate, gross of technical depreciation. We set the latter at 7% per 

















According to this equation, the domestic interest rate depends on the ratio between capital 
per worker in the leading group and local capital per worker. Plugging now equations 6 and 
5 into equation 1, we get a specific equation for WCCR: 
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If the country-risk premium falls to zero, the capital per worker for the lagging country may 
converge on the capital per worker for the leading group or just on a fraction of it. Equation 
7 assumes that capital per worker for the former stops growing at 90% of capital per worker 
for the latter. Static distortions (barriers to trade, market regulations, state-run enterprises, 
an inefficient tax system), poor natural resources, a small domestic market, and a distant 
location from large foreign markets help to explain the lack of full convergence. 
 
III. The measurement of the welfare cost 
 
If we now apply equation 7 to the data on capital per worker in the Appendix, we get figure 
2. It shows that the evolution of WCCR has been extraordinary in Argentina. In the period 
1895-1905 it was nill; in the period 1915-40 it was about 2.7% of per-capita income; in the 
period 1940-75 it averaged 7.2%, while for the period 1976-2006 it fluctuated largely with 
a mean value of 20.0%. 
 
Figure 2: Welfare Cost of Argentine Risk, 1875-2006 























































































































Our estimation rests on the following simplifying assumptions: 
 
·  k=3y, throughout the period 1875-2006 for the leading group and Argentina (Romer 




·  k=0.9k*, as discussed in the above paragraph. 
·  4 . 0 = a . For developed countries in the period 1947-1990, capital share in income 
fluctuated between 0.38 and 0.45, while for Latin American countries in the period 
1940-80 it fluctuated between 0.45 and 0.69 (Barro and Xala-i-Martín 1995, table 
10.8, p. 380-81). 
·  i*=7% per year. Gravelle (2005) suggests this figure for the rental price of capital in 
the USA. We can arrive at roughly the same number by figuring out the World real-
interest rate and the rate of technical depreciation. The first component of the rental 
price of capital is generally set at 3% per year. A reasonable figure for the second 
component is 4% per year. Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) estimate this number for 
developed countries. On the basis of estimates for the Argentine capital stock by the 
Dirección Nacional de Análisis y Planificación Global (1991), we arrive to a similar 
figure for the rate of capital decay. 
·  Residents save in foreign bonds, earning i* minus the rate of technical depreciation. 
 
Table 1 provides some sensitivity analysis. For the period 1976-2006, the welfare cost 
of Argentine risk rises to 25.3% of GDP if we assume full convergence; alternatively, the 
cost falls to 14% if we assume a share of capital in income closer to that observed for Latin 
American countries (Barro and Xala-i-Martín 1995). 
 
Table 1: Welfare Cost of Argentine Risk, 1976-2006 
As a percentage of GDP per capita 
 


















These results also depend critically on the rate of technical depreciation and the capital-
output ratio. Our assumptions look well founded on the former so we will not introduce any 
change in this respect. In spite of feeling less confident on the latter, we will stick to the  
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above estimates of the welfare cost for two reasons: a) According to Nehru and Dhareshwar 
(1993), for the period 1976-2006 it seems appropriate to set the capital-output ratio for the 
leading group and Latin America at 3; Coremberg et al (2007) calculate basically the same 
ratio for Argentina in such period; b) Nehru and Dhareshwar (ibid) calculate that the ratio 
rose from 2.2 in 1960 to 2.5 in 1973 for the high-income countries, and from 2.0 to 2.1 
between the same years for the Latin American countries. Yet if we estimate the welfare 
cost of Argentine risk for the period 1940-75 with these ratios we would find very little 
change: 7.0% of GDP instead of the previous 7.2% (for k=0.9k* and 4 . 0 = a ). 
Some measures of the welfare cost of conventional distortions should be considered to 
put our measures into perspective. Harberger (1974) estimates the efficiency loss due to the 
monopolization of U.S. manufacturing sector at 0.1% of GDP. Bergsman (1974) estimates 
the welfare cost of tariff and non-tariff protection in Brazil at 0.3% of GDP; he points out 
that this cost rises to an exceptional level of 7.1% after taking into account the losses for X-
efficiency and the monopolization of markets induced by protection itself. Fernández and 
Rodríguez (1980) estimate a welfare loss related to the Argentine state telephone monopoly 
at 1.5% of GDP for the year 1980. 
 
IV. Labor pays the cost 
 
As we know, the assumptions of a constant-returns-to-scale production function and perfect 
competition in the product and factors markets let’s conclude that payments to workers and 




If we now assume that the lagging country enjoys perfect access to World capital markets 
at the foreign interest rate plus the country-risk premium, we get to a startling conclusion: 
the WCCR would be wholly paid by the workers. 
 
9)  L w K i Y . ) * ( + + = r  (Where w stands for the wage rate.) 
 
Since payments to capitalists must equal the sum of the foreign interest rate and the country 
risk premium so that sinking capital in the country remains attractive, labor, the immobile 
factor of production, has no alternative but paying the cost of country risk. Figure 1 makes  
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clear this conclusion. Without country risk, the area below the demand curve for capital and 
above the foreign interest rate represents payments to labor. With country risk, the triangle 
and the rectangle represent foregone payments to labor. Potential payments involved in the 
triangle may be seen as wealth thrown away to the sea. Potential payments involved in the 
rectangle may be seen as the premium that investors pay to a hypothetical international firm 
providing insurance against macroeconomic and institutional instability. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The welfare cost of Argentine-risk seems large, much larger than the welfare cost estimated 
for trade tariffs and monopolies in well-known studies. Under standard assumptions on the 
production function, the organization of markets for product and factors of production, and 
investors’ access to World capital markets, we conclude that labor would end up paying the 
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Per Capita Capital Stocks for Argentina and the Anglo-Saxon Group (USA, Great Britain, 
Australia and Canada); Triangle, Rectangle and Total Costs as fractions of per Capita GDP, 
period: 1875-2006. 
 
  Argentina  Anglo-Saxon Group  Triangle Cost  Rectangle Cost  Total Cost 
            Per capita capital stock                Fraction of per capita GDP 
1875  2816  6703  0,069  0,122  0,191 
1876  2743  6597  0,072  0,124  0,196 
1877  3007  6627  0,052  0,107  0,159 
1878  2801  6808  0,075  0,126  0,201 
1879  2929  6913  0,067  0,120  0,187 
1880  3048  7235  0,069  0,121  0,190 
1881  2973  7427  0,082  0,131  0,213 
1882  3910  7294  0,026  0,077  0,103 
1883  4334  7566  0,019  0,065  0,084 
1884  4644  7430  0,011  0,051  0,063 
1885  5415  7440  0,003  0,029  0,032 
1886  5058  7413  0,006  0,038  0,044 
1887  5281  7738  0,006  0,038  0,044 
1888  6088  7678  0,001  0,017  0,018 
1889  6881  8041  0,000  0,006  0,007 
1890  6052  7825  0,002  0,020  0,022 
1891  5098  7995  0,010  0,048  0,058 
1892  6157  7646  0,001  0,014  0,015 
1893  6369  7262  0,000  0,003  0,003 
1894  7237  7325  0,001  0,000  0,001 
1895  7293  7423  0,000  0,000  0,000 
1896  7423  7541  0,000  0,000  0,000 
1897  6521  7557  0,000  0,005  0,005 
1898  6803  7980  0,000  0,007  0,007 
1899  8553  8221  0,001  0,000  0,001 
1900  7572  8316  0,000  0,000  0,000 
1901  8491  8429  0,001  0,000  0,001 
1902  8084  8436  0,000  0,000  0,000 
1903  9401  8640  0,002  0,000  0,002 
1904  10284  8681  0,004  0,000  0,004 
1905  10836  10971  0,001  0,000  0,001 
1906  10508  11670  0,000  0,000  0,000 
1907  9800  11771  0,000  0,010  0,010 
1908  10672  11161  0,000  0,000  0,000  
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1909  10606  11855  0,000  0,001  0,001 
1910  10459  12168  0,000  0,006  0,006 
1911  9763  12315  0,001  0,017  0,018 
1912  11230  12537  0,000  0,001  0,001 
1913  10531  12800  0,001  0,012  0,012 
1914  8895  11881  0,002  0,025  0,027 
1915  9349  12095  0,002  0,020  0,022 
1916  8672  13018  0,007  0,042  0,049 
1917  7356  13034  0,020  0,068  0,088 
1918  9152  13106  0,005  0,035  0,040 
1919  9116  12392  0,003  0,027  0,030 
1920  9124  12166  0,002  0,024  0,027 
1921  9203  11746  0,001  0,018  0,020 
1922  9897  12239  0,001  0,014  0,015 
1923  10511  12856  0,001  0,012  0,013 
1924  11046  13166  0,000  0,009  0,009 
1925  10271  13583  0,002  0,023  0,025 
1926  10633  13666  0,002  0,019  0,021 
1927  11149  14013  0,001  0,016  0,017 
1928  10897  14119  0,002  0,020  0,022 
1929  10710  14290  0,002  0,024  0,027 
1930  9588  13408  0,004  0,031  0,035 
1931  9618  12187  0,001  0,017  0,018 
1932  9103  11533  0,001  0,017  0,018 
1933  9155  11479  0,001  0,016  0,017 
1934  9755  12196  0,001  0,015  0,016 
1935  10793  12825  0,000  0,009  0,009 
1936  10192  13705  0,003  0,025  0,028 
1937  10745  14371  0,003  0,025  0,027 
1938  10594  14205  0,003  0,025  0,028 
1939  10823  14609  0,003  0,026  0,029 
1940  10827  15840  0,006  0,038  0,044 
1941  11209  17791  0,011  0,050  0,061 
1942  11150  19896  0,021  0,069  0,090 
1943  10895  21301  0,032  0,085  0,117 
1944  11920  21532  0,022  0,071  0,093 
1945  11342  20629  0,023  0,072  0,095 
1946  12147  18549  0,008  0,044  0,052 
1947  13265  18303  0,004  0,029  0,033 
1948  13704  18678  0,003  0,027  0,030 
1949  13198  18861  0,005  0,034  0,039  
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1950  12884  19757  0,009  0,045  0,053 
1951  13105  20643  0,010  0,049  0,059 
1952  12195  20881  0,017  0,062  0,079 
1953  12592  21375  0,016  0,061  0,077 
1954  12865  21315  0,014  0,057  0,071 
1955  13520  22178  0,013  0,055  0,068 
1956  13648  22578  0,014  0,057  0,070 
1957  14107  22595  0,011  0,052  0,063 
1958  14717  22497  0,008  0,044  0,053 
1959  13539  23245  0,017  0,063  0,080 
1960  14368  23704  0,014  0,056  0,070 
1961  15142  23980  0,011  0,050  0,060 
1962  14669  24663  0,015  0,059  0,074 
1963  14101  25511  0,022  0,071  0,094 
1964  15317  26703  0,019  0,065  0,084 
1965  16470  27651  0,015  0,059  0,074 
1966  16335  28523  0,019  0,065  0,084 
1967  16533  29018  0,019  0,066  0,086 
1968  17000  30081  0,020  0,068  0,088 
1969  18186  30981  0,016  0,061  0,078 
1970  18874  31327  0,014  0,057  0,071 
1971  19271  32018  0,014  0,057  0,072 
1972  19345  33202  0,017  0,063  0,080 
1973  19730  34821  0,020  0,067  0,087 
1974  20446  34877  0,016  0,062  0,078 
1975  19988  34780  0,018  0,065  0,083 
1976  19663  35943  0,024  0,073  0,097 
1977  20583  36776  0,021  0,069  0,090 
1978  19603  38005  0,031  0,083  0,114 
1979  20629  38841  0,027  0,078  0,105 
1980  20626  38523  0,026  0,077  0,103 
1981  19199  38885  0,037  0,091  0,129 
1982  18295  38043  0,042  0,096  0,138 
1983  18746  38935  0,042  0,096  0,137 
1984  18824  40736  0,049  0,103  0,152 
1985  17247  42122  0,076  0,127  0,203 
1986  18201  43003  0,068  0,120  0,188 
1987  18385  44330  0,073  0,124  0,197 
1988  17764  45828  0,091  0,138  0,229 
1989  16283  46794  0,128  0,161  0,289 
1990  15831  46688  0,138  0,167  0,306  
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1991  17319  45112  0,094  0,140  0,234 
1992  18915  45378  0,071  0,123  0,195 
1993  19898  46150  0,063  0,117  0,180 
1994  21281  47853  0,057  0,111  0,167 
1995  20056  48805  0,075  0,126  0,201 
1996  20652  49858  0,073  0,125  0,198 
1997  22124  51102  0,062  0,116  0,178 
1998  22715  52513  0,063  0,116  0,179 
1999  21701  54046  0,081  0,131  0,212 
2000  21300  55555  0,095  0,140  0,235 
2001  20159  56313  0,117  0,155  0,273 
2002  17767  57422  0,180  0,189  0,368 
2003  19158  58242  0,151  0,174  0,325 
2004  20692  59393  0,128  0,161  0,289 
2005  22385  60298  0,105  0,147  0,252 
2006  23831  61433  0,091  0,138  0,229 
Notes: 1) Per capita capital stock of a country equals three times its per capita income. 2) Per capita 
capital stock for the Anglo-Saxon group is the simple average of the per capita capital stocks of the 
four involved countries. 3) Triangle and Rectangle welfare costs are calculated according to eq. 7. 
4) To put the Argentine per capita income into 1985 US dollars, we generated time series for the 
four comparison years suggested by Cortés Conde (1997) and averaged them. 
Sources: 1) GDP times series for Argentina were taken from Cortés Conde (1997), period 1875-
1935; IEERAL (1986), period 1936-1961; BCRA, period 1962-1997. Population time series for 
Argentina were taken from Cortés Conde (1997), period 1875-1912; IEERAL (1986), period 1913-
1990. Remaining GDP and population data was taken from national accounts. 2) GDP and 
population series for the Anglo-Saxon group were taken from Maddison (1991) and updated until 
2006 on data taken from various issues of the IMF International Financial Satistics Yearbook. 
 